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ABSTRACT
Planned home birth has been considered by some to be
consistent with professional responsibility in patient care. This
article critically assesses the ethical and scientific justification for
this view and shows it to be unjustified. We critically assess re-
cent statements by professional associations of obstetricians, one
that sanctions and one that endorses planned home birth. We
base our critical appraisal on the professional responsibility model
of obstetric ethics, which is based on the ethical concept of medi-
cine from the Scottish and English Enlightenments of the 18th
century. Our critical assessment supports the following conclu-
sions. Because of its significantly increased, preventable perina-
tal risks, planned home birth in the United States is not clinically
or ethically benign. Attending planned home birth, no matter one’s
training or experience, is not acting in a professional capacity,
because this role preventably results in clinically unnecessary
and therefore clinically unacceptable perinatal risk. It is therefore
not consistent with the ethical concept of medicine as a profes-
sion for any attendant to planned home birth to represent himself
or herself as a “professional.” Obstetric healthcare associations
should neither sanction nor endorse planned home birth. Instead,
these associations should recommend against planned home
birth. Obstetric healthcare professionals should respond to ex-
pressions of interest in planned home birth by pregnant women
by informing them that it incurs significantly increased, prevent-
able perinatal risks, by recommending strongly against planned
home birth, and by recommending strongly for planned hospital
birth. Obstetric healthcare professionals should routinely provide
excellent obstetric care to all women transferred to the hospital
from a planned home birth. The professional responsibility model
of obstetric ethics requires obstetricians to address and remedy
legitimate dissatisfaction with some hospital settings and address
patients’ concerns about excessive interventions. Creating a sus-
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tained culture of comprehensive safety, which cannot be achieved
in planned home birth, informed by compassionate and respect-
ful treatment of pregnant women, should be a primary focus of
professional obstetric responsibility.
INTRODUCTION
Home births have increased in the United States
by 29 percent, from 2004 to 2009.1 The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
has stated that pregnant women have a right to elect
planned home birth.2 The Royal College of Obste-
tricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) goes further and
explicitly endorses planned home birth.3 These
statements make the implicit assumption that
planned home birth is compatible with professional
responsibility for pregnant and fetal patients in the
intrapartum period (occurring during childbirth).
The purpose of this article is to show that such an
assumption lacks scientific and ethical justification
and that therefore attendance at planned home birth
is a violation of professional responsibility.
Professional responsibility is an essential com-
ponent of all of clinical ethics. In planned home
birth, this is especially the case, as we will show in
this article. We therefore begin with an account of
the ethical concept of medicine as a profession and
its origins in the Scottish and English Enlighten-
ments. On this basis, we then set out the compo-
nents of the professional responsibility model of
obstetric ethics and contrast it with the maternal-
rights-based reductionist model. We then provide a
critical appraisal of the assumption in the ACOG
and the RCOG statements that planned home birth
is compatible with professional responsibility in ob-
stetric care. We also show that the ineliminable,
clinically unnecessary and therefore clinically un-
acceptable intrinsic perinatal risks of the home set-
ting mean that attendants at planned home birth,
regardless of their training, cannot justifiably con-
sider themselves to be professionals or claim to be
engaging in professional obstetric care. We conclude
by identifying the implications of the professional
responsibility model for planned hospital birth.
THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
MODEL OF OBSTETRIC ETHICS,
AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE
ETHICS OF PLANNED HOME BIRTH
The professional responsibility mode of obstet-
ric ethics has major implications for the ethics of
planned home birth. The professional responsibil-
ity model of obstetric ethics is based on the ethical
concept of medicine as a profession.4 When in the
history of Western medical ethics did this concept
originate? Many physicians and clinical ethicists
believe that medical professionalism has roots in
the Hippocratic Oath and other ethical texts in the
Hippocratic Corpus.5 However, the Hippocratic
Oath can reasonably be read as a guild oath, the
primary purpose of which was to secure the fealty
of young men who were not the sons of physicians.
“It is clear that the essential role of the Oath was to
preserve the interests and privileges of the family
possessing medical knowledge from the moment it
was made available to others.”6 The entire first sec-
tion of the Hippocratic Oath stipulates the obliga-
tions of these young men to their masters in the
guild, solemnized in a “written contract,”7 that is, a
loyalty oath.
Obstetric practice figures prominently in the
prescriptions and proscriptions that follow, which
are not explained but can be read as self-interested;
for example, avoiding high mortality rates and the
ruined reputation that they bring in their wake to
physicians whose patients die in high numbers. In
ancient Greek medicine, a pessary was a stone
placed in the cervix of a pregnant woman to cause
it to dilate, resulting in uterine contractions that
caused an induced abortion. In an era innocent of
infection control and aseptic pessaries (which we
now have), pessaries became major sources of in-
fections for women and subsequent deaths.
The oath calls for the protection of techné. This
term is wrongly translated as the “art” of medicine,
in contrast to the science of medicine, because
techné names the “science” of medicine. We use
the scare quotes to indicate that techné is not sci-
ence, but a fixed, unchanging, and unchangeable
set of knowledge about the four humors and their
imbalances, and the clinical skills of diagnosing the
course and severity of diseases and injuries and
intervening very modestly to alter that course.8 This
is not science as we know it. To make the Hippo-
cratic Oath and accompanying texts the basis of
professionalism in medicine is very odd, indeed.
Suppose, to the contrary, that the Hippocratic
Corpus does indeed present a concept of medicine
as a profession—rather than an unchanging, self-
interested guild—that comes down to us intact from
ancient Greece in what is usually invoked as the
“Hippocratic Tradition.” Robert Baker has dubbed
this view the “Hippocratic footnote,” and discred-
ited it.9 The historical problem is that there was no
Hippocratic tradition, as Vivian Nutton has shown.10
The oath fell out of favor in the early centuries of
the Common Era. In medieval and Renaissance uni-
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versities, graduates in medicine took an oath of loy-
alty to the faculty. Nutton argues that the mid-20th
century witnessed a conservative reaching back to
the revered founder of Western medicine, to valo-
rize a set of values that did not originate in ancient
Greece. Galvaõ-Sobrinho has argued that this has
been a common use of the historical figure of
Hippocrates. His name and the works that bear his
name have been invoked to valorize views that the
Hippocratic physicians would not recognize and are
even incompatible with the content of the Hippo-
cratic texts.11
The ethical concept of medicine as a profession
originated in the Scottish and English Enlighten-
ments.12 Two physician-ethicists, John Gregory
(1724-1773) of Aberdeen and Edinburgh in Scot-
land, and Thomas Percival (1740-1804) of Warring-
ton and Manchester in England, invented the ethi-
cal concept of medicine as a profession. They did
so precisely in response to the guild mentality that
had come to dominate Western medicine. The in-
dividual and group self-interest was epitomized in
the Statuta Moralia of the Royal College of Physi-
cians in London. These “moral statutes” were de-
signed to promote the self-interest of physicians in
such matters as cultivating good reputations by
never criticizing each other in public.13 At that time,
there was no accepted science of medicine, and
therefore no accepted educational pathway into
medical or surgical practice. Indeed, there were al-
most as many concepts of health and disease and
treatments as there were physicians, who competed
fiercely for the small private-practice market in the
homes of the well to do. Gregory and Percival also
wrote their medical ethics in response to the crisis
of trust of the sick. As Dorothy and Roy Porter have
convincingly documented from magisterial research
on 18th-century primary sources, sick persons did
not trust physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries
(forerunners of modern pharmacists) intellectually,
to know what they were doing, or morally, to be
more concerned about the well-being of the sick
than with lining their pockets with the money of
the sick.14 In present times, many pregnant women
who elect home birth do so on the basis of trust in
their attendants. This intellectual and moral trust
is warranted if and only if those attendants can jus-
tifiably be regarded as healthcare professionals.
Gregory and Percival’s invention of the ethical
concept of medicine and its commitments warrant-
ing the intellectual and moral trust of patients bear
directly on the ethics of planned home birth. Gre-
gory and Percival set out to reform medicine into
the profession that it has become over the past two
centuries. They did so by turning to the best scien-
tific method of their day: Baconian, experience-
based medicine (a forerunner of what is now known
as evidence-based medicine, or, better, the delib-
erative practice of medicine) and the best moral
science  of  their  day: Gregory to David Hume’s
sympathy-based moral science and philosophy
(1711-1776) and Percival to Richard Price’s (1723-
1791) intuition-based moral science and philoso-
phy.15
Using these intellectual resources, they forged
a three-component ethical concept of medicine as
a profession. First, physicians should commit to
becoming and remaining scientifically and clini-
cally competent. Second, physicians should use
their scientific and clinical competence primarily
to protect and promote the health-related interests
of patients, keeping individual self-interest system-
atically secondary. Third, physicians should com-
mit to sustaining medicine as a public trust (the
phrase is Percival’s) that exists primarily for the
benefit of patients and society, keeping group or
guild self-interest systematically secondary.16 The
result was to transform physicians from incompe-
tent, self-interested practitioners into professional
physicians. The sick were transformed into patients.
Thus was introduced into the history of medical
ethics the physician-patient relationship that is pri-
marily fiduciary and not primarily contractual in
nature.
The professional virtue of integrity is based in
the ethical concept of medicine as a profession. Pro-
fessional integrity comprises two commitments. The
first is to intellectual excellence that is achieved by
making the first commitment in the ethical concept
of medicine as a profession. The second is to moral
excellence that is achieved by making the second
and third commitments in the ethical concept of
medicine as a profession. Professional integrity
sometimes requires healthcare professionals to pro-
tect patients from themselves.17 In this respect, the
ethical concept of medicine is justifiably paternal-
istic in nature: it rests on the assumption that sci-
entific and clinical competence creates expertise
about healthcare that the typical patient does not
possess.
The ethical concept of being a patient is a func-
tion of the ethical concept of medicine as a profes-
sion. A human being becomes a patient when that
human being is presented to a physician or other
healthcare professional and there exist forms of
clinical management that are reliably expected in
deliberative (evidence-based, rigorous, transparent,
and accountable) clinical judgment to result in net
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clinical benefit for that human being. The ethical
concept of being a patient is beneficence based.18
The professional responsibility model of obstet-
ric ethics applies the ethical concept of medicine
as a profession to obstetric care.19 The focus of this
article is on planned home birth, which, by defini-
tion, occurs at the end of pregnancy. During the in-
trapartum period, the obstetric healthcare profes-
sional has two patients, the pregnant patient and
the fetal patient, when the pregnant women pre-
sents for care. The obstetric healthcare professional
therefore has beneficence-based obligations to both
the pregnant patient and fetal patient to protect and
promote their health-related interests. The obstet-
ric healthcare professional also has autonomy-based
obligations to the pregnant woman. These obliga-
tions focus on empowering the pregnant woman
with information that she needs to make decisions
with her obstetric healthcare professional about the
management of her pregnancy. The obstetric health-
care professional must in all cases take into account
and balance beneficence-based and autonomy-
based obligations to the pregnant patient and be-
neficence-based obligations to the fetal patient. This
ethically complex relationship means that the fetal
patient is not a separate patient, that is, beneficence-
based obligations to the fetal patient are a part of,
but not the entirety of, the ethical relationship be-
tween the obstetric healthcare professional and the
pregnant patient and fetal patient.20
The professional responsibility model stands in
sharp contrast to what we have elsewhere described
as the maternal-rights-based reductionist model of
obstetric ethics.21 In the rights-based reductionist
model, the pregnant woman’s autonomy is the con-
clusive ethical consideration throughout pregnancy.
She has an absolute right to bodily integrity, un-
constrained by any ethical obligations to the fetus.
The fetus is not a patient on this account and is
ethically inseparable from the pregnant woman, the
only patient in the rights-based reductionist model
of obstetric ethics. This model has important im-
plications for the relationship between the pregnant
woman and the obstetric provider. The relationship
is purely contractual, because the sole basis of the
relationship is the exercise of the pregnant woman’s
autonomy. In the professional responsibility model,
the pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity is
not absolute; it is justifiably constrained by profes-
sional integrity.
The maternal-rights-based reductionist model
has a radical implication that its advocates ignore.
In such a model of healthcare, there are no patients.
There are only sick individuals (aegtorus in the
Latin texts that precede Gregory and Percival in the
history of Western medical ethics, in which there
is no word that is reliably translated in English as
“patient”) or clients who contract with providers.
There are no healthcare professionals, because
rights-based-reductionist models embrace an abso-
lute right to the bodily integrity of the client, which
eliminates professional integrity as an ethically jus-
tified constraint on the client’s autonomy, because
it prevents the physician from intervening in a pro-
fessional manner. In the technical language of phi-
losophy, the maternal-rights-based reductionist
model, when it continues to use the language of
“patient,” is impermissibly parasitic on the profes-
sional responsibility model, which, as a matter of
the logic of concepts, the rights-based reductionist
model must reject.
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ASSUMPTION
THAT PLANNED HOME BIRTH IS COMPATIBLE
WITH PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
We began this article with references to state-
ments by professional obstetric associations of phy-
sicians. The ACOG sanctions the right of a preg-
nant woman to select the birth setting,22 while the
RCOG goes further and explicitly endorses planned
home birth.23 Both statements implicitly assume that
planned home birth is compatible with professional
responsibility to the pregnant patient and fetal pa-
tient in the intrapartum period of term pregnancies.
We disagree and turn now to a critical appraisal of
this implicit assumption.
We do so on the basis of our previous analyses
of planned home birth and a new data analysis that
was not available to either the ACOG or the RCOG.
In our previous analyses we have shown that
planned home birth, because the ineliminable risk
of emergency transport of laboring women to the
hospital, there is an increased risk of adverse peri-
natal outcomes.24 We have recently reported the
results of a new analysis of the U.S. Centers for Dis-
ease Control’s National Center for Health Statistics
birth certificate data files for the period 2007-2010
that strongly corroborates our earlier analyses.25 The
resulting study population of more than 13 million
births is the largest study population to date.
Our analysis focused on relative risk, the ratio
of the occurrence of an event in the group exposed
to a form of clinical management—planned home
birth in this case—versus the occurrence of an event
in the non-exposed group—hospital birth in this
case. Relative-risk analysis is commonly used in
comparative analysis of outcomes. We demonstrated
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a relative risk of 10.55 for five-minute Apgar scores
of zero for home versus hospital birth, which in-
creases to 14.24 for nulliparous women (women
who have not previously given birth). The relative
risk of seizures and other neurologic disorders was
3.80 for home versus hospital birth, which increased
to 6.28 for nulliparous women. These increased
risks result in clinically significant perinatal mor-
tality and morbidity that can be prevented by hos-
pital birth. These perinatal risks therefore become
clinically unnecessary to impose on the fetal and
neonatal patients, who cannot consent to them.
There is an obvious beneficence-based obligation
and therefore professional responsibility to prevent
such unnecessary clinical risks to fetal and neona-
tal patients when there is a safe and effective alter-
native. That alternative is a planned hospital birth,
which, our analysis indicates, significantly de-
creases perinatal morbidity and mortality. Given the
clinically unnecessary violation of beneficence-
based obligations to the fetal and neonatal patient,
any claim that the home birth setting is compatible
with professional integrity founders on these data.
In light of this new data analysis and its ethical
implications, it becomes apparent that the ACOG
statement suffers from internal inconsistency. First,
the ACOG’s position, in effect, holds that the preg-
nant woman’s right to select her preferred birth set-
ting at home should be recognized, even though the
ACOG recommends against planned home birth.26
The ethical implication of the new data analysis that
we have just described is that one cannot sanction
the right of a pregnant woman to select a birth set-
ting that is inconsistent with professional integrity
and responsibility without taking the view that such
a right is unconstrained by professional integrity
and responsibility. Yet the ACOG is committed to
the professional integrity of obstetric practice. Sec-
ond, in sanctioning such a right, the ACOG has im-
plicitly invoked the maternal-rights-based reduc-
tionist model. In simultaneously recommending
against planned home birth, the ACOG has implic-
itly invoked the professional responsibility model.
As is clear from the above account of the two mod-
els, the two models cannot be invoked simulta-
neously.
In light of the new data analysis and its ethical
implications, the RCOG’s problem is more serious.
By endorsing planned home birth, the RCOG has
implicitly embraced the view that planned home
birth is consistent with professional integrity and
responsibility.27 The clinically significant and un-
necessary increased relative perinatal risks of
planned home birth rule out such consistency.
As professional associations of obstetricians, the
ACOG and the RCOG should be committed to the
professional responsibility model of obstetric eth-
ics. Our clinical and ethical analysis of the CDC data
support the conclusion that planned home birth is
not compatible with professional integrity and
therefore professional responsibility in patient care.
In light of the new data analysis and its ethical im-
plications, both the ACOG and the RCOG should
reconsider their statements on planned home birth.
The RCOG now needs to justify its endorsement of
planned birth both scientifically and ethically. Both
the ACOG and the RCOG should unequivocally rec-
ommend against planned home birth. They should
also be clear that no obstetrician should participate
in planned home birth, because this would be fa-
cilitating clinically unnecessary, unsafe delivery,
which is incompatible with professional integrity.
Both the ACOG and the RCOG should be explicit
that intentionally facilitating unsafe clinical prac-
tice of any kind is not permitted in professional
medical practice.
The ACOG now needs especially to justify sci-
entifically and ethically its sanction of planned
home birth, because, as planned home birth has
increased in frequency, clinically unnecessary risks
of adverse perinatal outcomes have also increased.
Neither the ACOG nor the RCOG sanction a woman’s
right to smoke or consume spirit beverages during
pregnancy, and both explicitly recommend against
these behaviors during pregnancy.28 Any obstetri-
cian who were to endorse or even sanction such
clinically unsafe and unnecessary practices as
smoking or drinking alcohol by pregnant patients
would be justifiably regarded as acting inconsis-
tently with professional responsibility. Mutatis
mutandis, attendants at planned home birth, no
matter their training or experiences, should not be
regarded as acting consistently with professional
responsibility. It follows that planned home birth
should not be endorsed or even sanctioned by any
professional obstetric organization.
PLANNED HOME BIRTH ATTENDANTS
ARE NOT ACTING IN A
PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY
The ethical concept of medicine has an impor-
tant and heretofore unidentified implication for
planned home birth. In light of the new data analy-
sis, planned home birth is not consistent with the
first commitment in the ethical concept of medi-
cine as a profession. Scientifically and clinically
competent provision of obstetric services requires
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the capacity to diagnose and prevent obstetric com-
plications. Scientifically and clinically competent
provision of obstetric services also requires the abil-
ity to diagnose and respond quickly and effectively
to unexpected obstetric emergencies. No such ca-
pacities exist in planned home birth. This clinical
reality is not a function of who the attendant is. In-
stead, the setting of planned home birth is itself
determinative, because, given limited diagnostic
and treatment capacity and especially the high and
highly variable transport times, there is no assured
access to hospital-based advances in obstetric prac-
tices that have greatly improved maternal, fetal, and
neonatal outcomes of unexpected obstetric compli-
cations and emergencies over the past century. The
implication is clear and unfortunately stark: Any
claim by an attendant to planned home birth to be
providing scientifically and clinically competent
obstetric services is altogether implausible.29
The second commitment of the ethical concept
of medicine as a profession requires healthcare pro-
fessionals to protect and promote the health-related
interests of patients as the primary concern and
motivation, keeping self-interest systematically sec-
ondary. The inability to provide scientifically and
clinical competent obstetric services in the home
setting of planned home birth means that it is not
possible for this commitment to be met. This con-
clusion also has a clear and, unfortunately, stark
implication for attendants at planned home birth:
they cannot plausibly claim to be acting primarily
in the health-related interests of pregnant women,
fetuses, and neonates.
These two implications of the new data analy-
sis, we freely admit, are jarring. Together these two
implications support a third clear and, unfortu-
nately, stark implication: no one who attends a
planned home birth can with scientific, clinical, and
ethical justification claim the title of being a “pro-
fessional.” This applies equally to physicians, cer-
tified nurse midwives, and those who represent
themselves as professional or licensed midwives.
Because it is not justified to describe attendants at
home birth as professionals, no matter their train-
ing or experience, neither the pregnant woman nor
the neonate can justifiably be referred to as “pa-
tients.” The pregnant woman becomes merely a cli-
ent in a contractual, not professional, relationship.
This is the nature of the nonprofessional relation-
ship that results from the rights-based reductionist
model of obstetric ethics. There are associations of
professional midwives and they have codes of eth-
ics.30 Having such a code is usually one of the de-
fining features of a profession. This is not the case
for code of ethics of associations of attendants at
planned home birth. These codes of ethics cannot
plausibly be represented to pregnant women or to
the public as professional codes of ethics.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND HOSPITAL BIRTH
The professional responsibility model of obstet-
ric ethics has important implications for obstetric
practice. First and foremost, when a pregnant
woman is transported to the hospital from a planned
home birth, she should receive uniformly excellent
obstetric care. The second component of the ethi-
cal concept of medicine as a profession requires the
entire obstetric team to focus on the patient and not
themselves. This means that no judgmental attitudes
should be cultivated and no judgmental statements
ever be made.31 Because they would be self-indulg-
ing, such attitudes and statements would be patently
inconsistent with professional responsibility.
The professional responsibility model also calls
for continuous enhancement of the organizational
culture of hospital-based obstetric care. First and
foremost, the professional responsibility model calls
for an organizational culture of safety and preven-
tion of clinically unnecessary interventions.32 Pa-
tient safety has become the paramount goal of hos-
pital-based obstetrics over the past decade. This
change has required reforming organizational cul-
ture and includes the adoption of team principles
and safety drills.33 Adopting a comprehensive safety
culture reduced the rate of cesarean delivery.34
Adopting a comprehensive safety culture has be-
come an important means for responding effectively
to the concerns of pregnant women about excessive
obstetric interventions in the hospital setting. These
improvements implement the first commitment of
the ethical concept of medicine as a profession. The
majority of these safety goals cannot be satisfacto-
rily implemented at a planned home birth. While
the team concept in the hospital includes multidis-
ciplinary members, such as certified nurse mid-
wives, nurses, anesthesiologists, pediatricians, and
obstetricians, there is no team concept at a planned
home birth. At a planned home birth there is al-
most always only one attendant assisting the preg-
nant woman with her delivery. As a consequence,
team care cannot occur, much less become a com-
ponent of planned home birth, which is not com-
patible with quality obstetric care.
The second commitment of the ethical concept
of medicine as a profession requires the creation of
an organizational culture of compassion that sup-
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ports the preferences of pregnant women through-
out their pregnancies and aims to maximize a home-
like setting in the hospital. For example, there
should be self-conscious, deliberate efforts to cre-
ate a quiet setting on labor and delivery and post-
partum floors.35
CONCLUSION
Planned home birth in the U.S. is not clinically
or ethically benign and is not consistent with pro-
fessional responsibility to and for pregnant, fetal,
and neonatal patients. Obstetric healthcare associa-
tions should neither sanction not endorse planned
home birth. Instead, these associations should rec-
ommend against planned home birth. Obstetric
healthcare professionals should respond to expres-
sions of interest in planned home birth by pregnant
women by informing them that it has significantly
increased, preventable, and clinically unnecessary
perinatal risks, by recommending strongly against
planned home birth, and by recommending strongly
for planned hospital birth. Obstetric healthcare pro-
fessionals should routinely provide excellent ob-
stetric care to all women transferred to the hospital
from a planned home birth. It is incompatible with
the ethical concept of medicine as a profession for
any attendant to planned home birth to represent
himself or herself in any way as a healthcare pro-
fessional.
The professional responsibility model of obstet-
ric ethics requires obstetricians to address and rem-
edy the legitimate dissatisfaction of pregnant
women with some hospital settings. Creating a sus-
tained culture of comprehensive safety, which can-
not be achieved in planned home birth, informed
by compassionate and respectful treatment of preg-
nant women, should be a primary focus of profes-
sional obstetric responsibility.
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